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Dissuasion in U.S. Defense Strategy  
22 September 2004  
A Workshop hosted by the Center for Contemporary Conflict and sponsored by the Defense Threat 
Reduction Agency's Advanced Systems and Concepts Office.  
Conference report by Peter R. Lavoy, Barry Zellen, and Christopher Clary. Papers presented at the 
conference are available in the October 2004 edition of Strategic Insights, the Center for Contemporary 
Conflict's e-journal.  
 
 
Panel One: Introductory Session  
The Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Contemporary Conflict organized a workshop on Dissuasion 
in U.S. Defense Strategy on 22 September 2004. The workshop was part of the Monterey Strategy 
Seminar. It was initiated and sponsored by the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s Advanced 
System and Concepts Office to enable the Center for Contemporary Conflict to bring together a top-notch 
group of experts and consider the role dissuasion might play in future U.S. defense strategy.  
Dr. Kerry Kartchner from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency discussed the sponsor’s expectations. 
Kartchner recalled that the process of developing a Cold War “deterrence” consensus didn't happen 
overnight. The ideas of deterrence and mutual assured destruction (MAD) took several years of 
conferences, workshops, debate, and articles to take shape. Kartchner said he believes dissuasion is a 
useful elaboration on the classic theory of deterrence, and added that the seminar would explore the 
“who,” the “what,” the “why” of dissuasion, and identify the tools of dissuasion.  
CCC director Dr. Peter R. Lavoy previewed the day's lineup of panelists and their prepared essays. Lavoy 
indicated that the day’s discussions would address the targets of dissuasion, its relationship to other U.S. 
defense goals, the relationship between force and diplomacy, as well as unilateral versus multilateral 
actions—because international organizations may mitigate dangerous security competitions, Lavoy 
suggested it might be in our interest to have those efforts dovetail with some multilateral measures.  
Lavoy also presented a matrix displaying a range of countries that pose difference challenges to 
dissuasion. If one considers a wide range of U.S. relations with these countries, from amity to enmity—
including allies, coalition partners, friends, neutrals, adversaries, ideological enemies—where does 
dissuasion fit?  
 
Lavoy observed that rogue and failed states, as well as non-state actors, may be very difficult to dissuade 
even though we might very much wish to influence their conduct. He noted it is an especially tall task to 
dissuade ideological enemies, who are "predisposed not to be persuaded by you." He said this was the 
case with the Soviet Union during the Cold war and also appears to characterize the challenges of 
dissuading rogue states today.And then there is the issue of dissuading allies, something that can be 
seen as "very impolite.” Case in point—how do you dissuade a country like Pakistan, which is crucial for 
the success of U.S. strategic objectives but also has been a consistent source of troubling behavior? 
Within the realm of military competition, Lavoy said dissuasion can be applied toward weapons of mass 
destruction and their means of delivery. Regarding the Soviet Union, Lavoy asked, "did we ever dissuade 
them or not?" After all, they didn't develop a new generation of aircraft carriers. But were they dissuaded, 
or did they simply realize they were a land power, without the need for such a naval platform? Such 
strategic ambiguity is the hallmark of dissuasion, just as it was with the world of deterrence that preceded 
it.  
Lavoy posited that "dissuasion runs against the grain of world politics in some sense," because it is "a 
natural impetus of all states to acquire as much power as possible," as realist theorists, such as John 
Mearsheimer, believe. But "if every country is compelled to acquire as much power as possible, how can 
dissuasion work?" Enter the security dilemma, where "steps taken to increase our security decrease the 
security of others." As we get stronger, don't we give competing states a stronger impetus to compete 
against us? Looking to the defense requirements of dissuasion, Lavoy asked if dissuasion should be an 
overarching policy, or just "a component of our strategy vis-à-vis China or WMD proliferation," to cite two 
examples. Further, he asked, is dissuasion primarily a Department of Defense (DOD) mission, or a U.S. 
government mission, or a coalition mission? After all, he added, "it might really take a village to be 
effective at dissuasion for the long run."  
Panel Two: Dissuasion As Policy 
The panel considered existing dissuasion policy guidance and explored the relationship between 
dissuasion and other strategic goals.  
One of the speakers noted that after 9/11, dissuasion helped fill a void which seemed to be insufficiently 
dealt with by assurance, deterrence and defeat. Dissuasion has emerged as a tool for the current 
strategic environment, since there are opponents that we “can’t deter” and “can’t defeat.” The problem is 
that dissuasion is a fairly amorphous goal right now. It is not clear what it means, and this ambiguity 
reflects a similar position to where we were at the start of the Cold War, when we didn't really know what 
deterrence meant.  
The same speaker noted dissuasion presents "many challenges," such as what we tell our allies, the 
public, and our adversaries. And how do we dissuade both state and non-state actors? He presented the 
Department of Defense’s new matrix of four distinct categories of threats—traditional, irregular, 
catastrophic, and destructive—and argued that each might require a "different art of persuasion." 
Dissuasion relies upon multiple components of national power. Diplomatic tools include allies and 
partnerships, whereas military tools include security cooperation and training exercises. Technology tools 
include trade sanctions and embargoes on prohibited technology. He described the need to look at what 
DOD brings to the game, and where we can make investments and make equipment capability 
investment decisions, and invest in our people to prepare for executing dissuasion as strategy.  
 
Fmr. Asst. Sec. of Defense Edward Warner and Mr. Martin Neill from the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy.  
A separate speaker explained the need for having effective, short slogans to try to capture dimensions of 
your strategy. Hence, the quartet of the 2001 QDR to "assure, deter, dissuade, defeat" adversaries of the 
United States. This speaker said dissuasion falls within that "subset of preventive measures" with the 
target being "decision-makers and their decision calculus," with one of the primary goals of dissuasion 
being the acquisition of WMD and their means of delivery. To achieve dissuasion requires having a set of 
capabilities to thwart that behavior, coupled with threatening declaratory statements that "if you move that 
way, we will punish you." He concurred that dissuasion goes beyond military instruments but requires the 
whole range of national power.  
During the course of the discussion that followed, it was determined that dissuasion, like deterrence, is 
very difficult to gauge. Looking into the past, it is difficult to point to examples where “X country was 
dissuaded by Y action(s).” As a consequence, it is difficult, if not impossible, to measure the success of 
dissuasion as a strategy.  
Panel Three: Targets of Dissuasion  
The next panel took a look at regional case studies of dissuasion, and its objectives included discussing 
the kinds of countries, coalitions, sub-state and non-state actors that should be dissuaded.  
China 
Dr. Brad Roberts of the Institute for Defense Analyses indicated it was a matter of conjecture whether 
China was simply a target of dissuasion or the primary target of dissuasion. The challenge of dissuading 
China from engaging the United States as a peer is altogether different from dissuading smaller states 
from developing nuclear weapons, Roberts contended. Interestingly, the 2001 QDR report’s focus on 
emerging peer adversarial relationships retreated from center stage in the Bush administration's strategic 
thinking, evident by the shift in thought presented in the National Security Strategy that followed the QDR. 
China’s post-9/11 cooperation in the global war on terrorism has helped foster a more optimistic vision 
within the Bush administration in which great power rivalry could be subsumed by cooperation against 
common threats.  
In this context, Roberts asked how should we configure our strategic posture in order to de-motivate 
China's choice to sprint to some medium-term advantage in its strategic posture. Roberts identified five 
potential force postures for dissuasion, and assessed each of them with regard to the goal of dissuading 
China: (1) through large nuclear deployments, (2) strategic responsiveness, (3) strategic defeat, (4) 
selective competition, and (5) mutual contingent restraint. Large nuclear deployments and strategic 
responsiveness appear ill-suited to dissuade China’s military competition since they presume an offense-
offense competitive paradigm, in contrast to China's offense-defense mode of competition. Strategic 
defeat, while the best strategy to deal with rogues, is problematic for dissuading China since it offers no 
benefit for restraint, and could motivate an arms race or precipitate the very war the United States seeks 
to avoid—while also risking alarming U.S. allies. Selective competition worked against the Soviets, but 
China today is quite different from the USSR of the 1980s. And mutual contingent restraint would appear 
to work against the current administration's commitment to ballistic missile defense (BMD). Roberts 
explained that dissuasion is in essence a hedging strategy, with the challenge being that hedging 
sometimes backfires, creating the very situation it sought to prevent.  
Russia 
Dr. James Goldgeier from George Washington University discussed the case of Russia, and looked at the 
range of deterrence and dissuasion policies the United States has applied to the Soviet Union and Russia 
since the end of the Second World War. Today, U.S. policy toward Russia is not so much about trying to 
dissuade it from becoming a peer competitor—that is not going to happen—but dissuading it from 
reconstituting empire in Central Asia and also facilitating the military ambitions of others. So far, the 
United States has a mixed report card: Russian democratization appears to have stalled, if not gone into 
remission; Russia repeatedly has defied U.S. wishes in providing dual-use technologies to states of 
proliferation concern; but Russia has not been able to reconstitute its past empire in Central Asia, largely 
because of its own limited capabilities. 
Goldgeier argued that there was a range of possible explanations for U.S. difficulty in dissuading Russia 
from troublesome activity. First, there may have been insufficient incentives for Russia to stop this 
conduct. Second, dissuasion may have assumed a unitary target when in fact that was not the case. For 
instance, Russian President Boris Yeltsin may have lacked sufficient control over the Ministry of Atomic 
Energy to elicit a change in technological cooperation. Third, the U.S. refusal to move back from NATO 
expansion may have led to a Russian refusal to cooperate with the United States on bilateral arms control 
and nonproliferation efforts towards Iran. Fourth, rumors have suggested for some time that the Russians 
may have concluded a deal with the Iranians that if Iran would not support the Chechens, Russia would 
continue to provide technological cooperation to Tehran. If these rumors were true, there would be little 
the United States could do that would affect Moscow’s calculations.  
Goldgeier came to several conclusions with regard to dissuasion. First, when trying to dissuade an 
ideological foe, dissuasion means deterrence and reliance on threats to succeed. Only after Moscow 
abandoned the ideological competition, Goldgeier argued, did carrots play a useful role. For carrots to 
work, they must outweigh the benefits the adversary is getting from the unwanted behavior, and they 
must be acceptable to the stakeholders responsible for the unwanted behavior. As well, policymakers 
must be able to deliver those carrots. Additionally, when sticks come into play, they must be credible in 
order to be effective. In the end, it is important to realize that the adversary might be playing its own game 
of linkage against the United States, as Russia appears to have done over NATO expansion.  
Allies  
Dr. David Yost of the Naval Postgraduate School discussed the possibility of dissuading allies, and 
observed that a certain awkwardness, even embarrassment arises when dissuading allies is discussed. 
Allies are different from adversaries in that they are partners—but even partners can disagree when it 
comes to the goals of dissuading mutual adversaries. NATO has disagreed on dissuasion and, as seen 
during the 1980s, on the merits of influencing the behavior of one’s adversary through shaping or 
channeling arms competition. Even today, Yost noted that allies emphasize instruments other than 
military superiority, such as nonproliferation regimes and nation-building. Yost believes that dissuasion 
strategies may be difficult to pursue in an alliance setting because they involve speculative judgments 
about the effects of policies designed to shape adversary behavior, which can vary significantly across 
alliance partners. Yost also considered the challenge of targeting allies as the object of dissuasion, noting 
that dissuading allies not to pursue certain military capabilities may sound manipulative or impolite, but 
nonetheless has been an explicit part of national policy on both sides, such as with extending deterrence 
and promoting nonproliferation for both Germany and Turkey.  
Yost explained that NATO allies differ in their ambitions and in their capacity to compete. As such, it is not 
surprising that Britain and France are both nuclear weapons states since they have long histories as 
Great Powers and remain less willing to depend on others for their security. In recent years, the United 
States has not been preoccupied with dissuading its NATO allies from becoming competitors but rather 
has actively tried to persuade them to “do more." The Cold War ended in debate between Washington 
and its NATO allies over “burden sharing,” which began with U.S. efforts to persuade allies to spend more 
on conventional forces when most of allies preferred to rely on U.S. nuclear commitments. Yost 
concluded by noting that ally dissuasion is a two-way street. From the 1990s to the present, European 
allies have attempted to shape the U.S. military posture, in particular by encouraging the United States to 
enter into and maintain treaty commitments. The intense European efforts to encourage continued U.S. 
adherence to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Treaty are illustrative of how such dissuasive activities are 
likely to be carried out, and also how such dissuasive activities can fail.  
Rogue States 
Dr. Robert Litwak of the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars explored the challenge of 
dissuading rogue states. Current policy lacks clarity with regard to the target of dissuasion, and whether 
rogues are a central objective of this strategy, or if dissuasion is instead focused on potential peer 
adversaries. Dissuading a rogue state is greatly complicated by the U.S. pursuit of regime change against 
some of these targets. Iraq was presented as a “warning to other states,” though pragmatists in the 
administration feared it would backfire by motivating Iran and North Korea to accelerate their WMD 
acquisition efforts. Litwak believes the administration is now pursuing, very reluctantly, a pragmatic pivot 
from the regime change/preemption model to an alternative deterrence/assurance of regime survival, and 
that both North Korea and Iran should be presented with structured choices, so they understand that 
benefits will come from behavior change, and that non-compliance will result in penalties.  
Robert Litwak speaks on dissuading rogue states with James Goldgeier in 
background.  
Litwak considered the case of Libya, whose “surprise announcement” that it would completely, verifiably, 
and irreversibly dismantle its weapons of mass destruction programs was viewed by many in the 
administration as a “demonstration-effect” of Iraq. But Litwak said that Libya’s WMD program reversal 
likely was influenced also by assertive interdiction activities like the Proliferation Security Initiative. Litwak 
argued that the "crux" of the deal was assurance of regime survival as opposed to dissuasion. Or, as 
Clinton administration officials would say, perhaps it was the U.S. willingness to take “yes” as the answer, 
and thus Washington did not pursue regime change when abdication of WMD capabilities was sincerely 
offered. Will we do the same for North Korea and Iran? He noted the New York Times recently reported 
the administration is split over the pursuit of regime change or behavior change, and added he's 
concerned that as a result of this internal confusion that these regimes believe we will not take yes as an 
answer, undercutting our efforts at dissuasion. Litwak says his core conclusion is that dissuasion can not 
affect rogue state intentions so long as the U.S. objective is regime change.  
Discussion 
A commentator on the panel noted that if our end goal is to make sure those who want to do us harm do 
not have the military technology to do so, then dissuasion should be targeted at both sides of the 
equation—i.e., both the supply end and the demand end—to see where we have the best chance at 
interfering in the supply/demand relationship. For instance, this participant noted that in the case of 
Russia, the United States put pressure on the supply end ( Russia) to inhibit Iran from attaining the 
nuclear technology we do not want them to have, rather than directly on the demand end, where we do 
not have the levers to make the Iranian government respond. Next, the commentator noted the U.S. need 
to look at the emotive base for weapons acquisition when assessing how best to dissuade others from 
WMD programs. The commentator referenced Niccolo Machiavelli's belief that it is good to be feared but 
not hated, since fear will inhibit action, while hate only propels it. If the target of dissuasion is still at the 
"fear stage," this participant argued that there remains an open window of opportunity. But, if they have 
made it to hatred stage, then the United States will have to work on the supply end, since the receiving 
end is no longer persuadable.  
The participants then considered the question of whether dissuasion is smart policy. One speaker 
acknowledged that there is a case to be made, certainly among our allies, that dissuasion may not be 
smart policy, because we would prefer to be able to lean on them when necessary for coercing others. 
Secondly, is the effectiveness of dissuasion measurable? Several speakers argued that while outcomes 
might be measurable—whether Russia transfers nuclear technology to Iran or the number of cyber-
attacks on U.S. systems from the Chinese mainland—determining causality will remain difficult. 
Dissuasion, like deterrence before it, is based on assumptions of how your actions will be perceived and 
how others will respond to such perceptions.  
Conference participants enjoy lunch poolside.  
Panel Four: Scope of Dissuasion  
International Nonproliferation Regimes 
Dr. Scott Sagan of Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation observed 
identified severe tensions and deep contradictions between the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT) 
regime and the U.S. strategy of dissuasion, and argued that scholars and policymakers must confront 
these to make wise policy choices. The best way to overcome these contradictions, Sagan said, is to 
identify the underlying assumptions, and tensions, between these two strategies which have the shared 
aim of preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.  
Scott Sagan discusses the implications of dissuasion for the non-proliferation 
regime.  
Sagan places the world's states into four distinct categories: (1) current nuclear weapons states; (2) latent 
nuclear weapons states with the technological know-how and infrastructure to become nuclear states in 
short order; (3) non-nuclear states either with no nuclear infrastructure or with limited nuclear 
infrastructure; and (4) "active proliferators" such as Iran and North Korea. Sagan argued that the NPT, 
which aims to slow the proliferation of nuclear weapons from the haves to the have-nots, and encourage 
the peaceful use of nuclear technology by those states that develop nuclear know-how, is sustained by 
three related bargains designed to reduce the incentive on non-nuclear states to acquire nuclear 
arsenals. And despite the exceptions presented by North Korea and Iran, Sagan points out that many 
other states have been successfully constrained by their NPT obligations. Unless the challenges facing 
the NPT are dealt with, we run the risk of seeing a significant number of non-nuclear states with the ability 
to develop nuclear weapons, all of whom in short order will be forced to reconsider the costs and benefits 
of remaining in the treaty.  
In contrast to the NPT, Sagan explained that the logic of dissuasion is rooted in the idea that states will be 
constrained from developing advanced weapons capacity by their belief that U.S. defensive and offensive 
capabilities are so strong that their quest to match these would be cost-prohibitive. But the logic of 
dissuasion contradicts the logic of the NPT, since to dissuade potential adversaries from acquiring WMD, 
the United States must maintain significant nuclear numerical superiority over others, contradicting Article 
VI's commitment to work toward the elimination of nuclear weapons. Sagan pointed out an additional 
contradiction in the logic of dissuasion—noting that rogue states, which are presented as so irrational 
they cannot be deterred, are expected to be rational enough to be dissuaded. Sagan noted that 
dissuasion has always been a goal of U.S. strategy but in the past it was in the background, and not so 
clearly elevated to the foreground of U.S. strategic thinking. Now that dissuasion is front and central, 
Sagan is concerned that its logic will continue to erode the already fragile foundations of the NPT, a 
system which, despite its imperfections, has remaining strengths worthy of preservation.  
NBC Weapons Proliferation  
Col. Charles Lutes of the Institute for National Strategic Studies of the National Defense University 
examined the “who, when, and how” of the dissuasion of NBC weapons proliferation. First, he placed the 
world's strategic actors on a scale of increasing difficulty to dissuade, with allies among those least 
difficult to dissuade, followed in turn by global and regional powers, rogue states, WMD suppliers, and 
lastly, terrorists. He argued that it is harder to persuade rogue states and terrorists since dissuasion 
depends upon the implicit assumption of rationality and assumes rational action on the part of the part of 
the entity to be dissuaded. The less rational, the harder it is to persuade. However, Lutes considered that 
perhaps terrorists and rogues were rational in their own context.  
Next, he examined the “when” of dissuasion, noting that dissuasion is more effective early in a NBC 
weapons program lifecycle. He presented a timeline for dissuasion, noting that assurance is preferable to 
influence intentions; dissuasion to thwart active acquisition; deterrence to prevent possession; and 
defense/defeat to prevent WMD use. Assurance is best-suited when there is only the intent to acquire, 
but once the entity in question acquires and possesses WMD, deterrence is more appropriate. Before an 
actor develops a strong WMD intent, Lutes noted a combination of assurance and dissuasion may be 
sufficient to convince it not to proceed. But once an actor starts actively acquiring WMD, Lutes argued 
dissuasive strategies alone provide the primary mechanism to counter this course. After an actor gains a 
WMD capability, the equation changes, and its threat of use is now countered predominantly through 
deterrence and defeat mechanisms. After WMD acquisition, Lutes noted, dissuasion is aimed at 
discouraging upgrades and advancement in technology.  
Lutes observed that we tend to use WMD as a “one size fits all” term, failing to distinguish between 
nuclear, chemical, biological, or missile programs, when in fact each has quite different barriers to access 
and potential benefits. Looking ahead, Lutes believes one of the biggest challenges ahead may come 
from dissuading competition in emerging technologies that could have a revolutionary impact on military 
affairs, such as nanotechnology, genomic research, microelectromechanical systems (MEMS), and 
directed energy weapons. He added that countering the next weapon of mass destruction before it is 
developed is the ultimate challenge.  
Dissuasion and Confrontation: U.S. Policy in the India-Pakistan Case 
COL John H. Gill of the Near East-South Asia Center of the National Defense University examined U.S. 
dissuasion policy during several conflicts and crises between India and Pakistan, focusing particularly on 
the 1965 Kashmir War, the 1971 Bangladesh War, the 1999 Kargil conflict, and the 2001-2002 composite 
crisis. In the months prior to the 1965 war, ambiguous U.S. statements to its ally Pakistan may have 
emboldened Islamabad to launch the effort to “defreeze” the Kashmir dispute. However, the U.S. arms 
embargo contributed to the war’s limited duration. In the 1971 Bangladesh War, the United States only 
placed limited pressure on Pakistan to limit its suppression of the Bengali population in its eastern half. 
After the war began, Washington publicly and privately “tilted” toward Pakistan and deployed a Navy 
battle group to the Bay of Bengal as a warning to India. The tilt did little to stop Bangladeshi 
independence, and the deployment of the U.S.S. Enterprise had no impact on Indian decisions at the 
time, though it left a scar on Indian decision-makers, which would be cited as a justification for India’s 
nuclear weapons program. During the 1999 Kargil conflict, the United States was unable to prevent 
Pakistan from its dangerous land grab—partially because it had difficulty dissuading behavior it did not 
anticipate. The focus was instead on preventing Indian horizontal escalation, and Washington’s efforts 
seemed to have influenced Delhi’s decision to keep the conflict limited. During the 2001-2002 compound 
crisis, repeated visits by high profile U.S. leaders, most notably Secretary of State Colin Powell, combined 
with powerful messages of escalation avoidance actually worked very well.  
 
COL Jack Gill presents on dissuading Indo-Pakistani crises.  
Gill concluded that while the record for U.S. dissuasion in the India-Pakistan conflict is mixed, the United 
States has an important role to play on its own and with others. Among its most effective dissuasive tools 
are personal diplomacy, public diplomacy, economic measures, coordination with international partners, 
and the sound foundation of a long-term bilateral relationship. Less useful has been military force, though 
robust military-to-military programs have proven helpful to influencing behavior. Other factors to consider, 
Gill said, include balancing global and regional policies, and considering the impact of contemporary 
actions on the future in the region.  
Dissuasion and Regional Allies: The Case Of Pakistan 
Retired Brigadier Feroz Hasan Khan examined U.S. dissuasion from the Pakistani perspective, 
presenting a paper co-authored with CCC's research associate Mr. Christopher Clary. Khan noted that 
America's dissuasive capability is "severely constrained" by Pakistan's focus on regional threats, while the 
United States has tended to focuse on international issues, such as nuclear proliferation. As a result, the 
United States was unable to dissuade Pakistan from pursuing nuclear weapons acquisition, and Khan 
observed that U.S. dissuasive efforts have often led to other behaviors that proved more harmful to U.S. 
interests. Referring to the famous quotation by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Khan explained, “sometimes when you 
expect a country to be dissuaded on something critical to its national security, sometimes they would 
rather eat grass than abandon the Bomb.” Pakistan has learned that it must look to its own capabilities in 
order to deter future aggression, having seen its closest friends side with India in 1965 and in recent 
conflicts such as Kargil.  
Pakistan continues to pursue a three-pronged strategy: (1) maintaining the conventional capability to 
deny India the strategic space to prosecute a limited war against it; (2) using proxies as part of an 
asymmetric strategy to tie down India in Kashmir, and earlier to defeat the Red Army in Afghanistan; and 
(3) developing its nuclear arsenal to deny India victory in a general war. While enabling Pakistan to 
confront regional threats, Khan noted Pakistani military strategy may have undermined U.S. security 
objectives in the region, and the emergence of the Taliban and revelation of A.Q. Khan's global nuclear 
supplier network are byproducts of this troubled U.S.-Pakistan alliance, as efforts to combat one problem 
can result in even tougher problems down the road. Khan noted the "fundamental challenge" inherent in 
dissuading an ally, as "when that threat is on the doorstep, the exigencies of defeating the enemy trump 
abstract dissuasion goals," and it is only after that threat recedes that dissuasion returns to prominence. 
Today, Khan said, the United States aims to dissuade Pakistan in three areas: nonproliferation, regional 
instability, and support for radical Islamists. Khan believes for the United States to effectively dissuade 
Pakistan, it needs to focus on minimizing its competition with India, and stabilizing its border with 
Afghanistan. Dissuasion in South Asia means conflict management—and ultimately conflict resolution. 
The previous five decades of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship offer ample evidence that dissuading an ally 
with intense regional security concerns is very difficult.  
Panel Five: Dissuasion as Strategy  
The afternoon session concerned the level, type, and modality of force required to dissuade; the balance 
between unilateral action and support for international institutions and norms; and defense posture 
requirements for the United States.  
Dissuading Terrorism  
Dr. Joseph Pilat of Los Alamos National Laboratory began by asking the question that has been troubling 
analysts, “Why haven’t we seen more WMD terrorism?” He observed that significant WMD capabilities in 
significant quantities are difficult to produce and by their nature increase the chances of detection and 
interdiction. Additionally, he explained that if the United States looks at targeting non-state actors or 
support states that might provide key capabilities, we might dissuade them by identifying a credible threat 
to remove them, such as finding individuals with reputable expertise if their behavior was criminalized. As 
for state supporters, Pilat said that in many ways they can be dealt with in a more traditional manner. As 
strategies for WMD dissuasion are developed, he added that we must take account of the differences in 
WMD, since they each have different impacts and different capabilities they offer terrorists as well as 
different instruments that can be brought to bear against them. Nonetheless, Pilat believes that prospects 
are not great for completely successful dissuasion, and that there is some possibility that WMD terrorism 
might come to pass. While dissuasion will never be the ultimate instrument for dealing with the constant 
threat of terrorism, it could be part of an array of strategic capabilities brought to bear against WMD 
terrorists and would-be terrorists.  
Force Structure and Dissuasion  
Ms. Elaine Bunn of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University noted 
that the whole world is watching our force structure, and that U.S. deployments send messages to 
multiple audiences, and thus have a role in dissuasion. Bunn next defined dissuasion as efforts to 
discourage current/potential adversaries from developing, deploying, augmenting, enhancing qualitatively, 
or transferring military capabilities which threaten the United States or its forces. Or, in plainer English, 
the stuff you have, where you put your stuff, what you say about your stuff, how you use your stuff, the 
stuff you have, and how it gets you stuff in the future. Next, Bunn turned to the issue of China and BMD, 
and pondered whether BMD will be successful in dissuading China from augmenting its missile force or if 
it may send it down another path such as developing threats to the U.S. space assets or offensive 
information operations. In contrast to these thorny threats, she argued that the weapons of mass 
destruction arena is the most manageable.  
Looking forward to new technologies and capabilities, Bunn turned next to science and technology 
investment decisions, and observed there are many options that we could bring to fruition in the future 
that will help us develop a pretty thorough dissuasion capability. Bunn explained by letting dissuasion be 
a factor to be considered when making budget decisions, it really does give the future a seat at the table.  
Challenges for U.S. Combatant Commands  
Mr. Greg Giles of Science Applications International Corporation noted that dissuasion is the least 
developed and understood of the 2001 QDR's four defense policy goals. As such, dissuasion is long on 
assertions, claiming that a well-targeted strategy and policy can therefore dissuade other countries from 
initiating military competitions, while it is short on analysis, articulation, and guidance. Giles discussed 
dissuasion's conceptual challenges, noting the ambiguity between threat- versus capabilities-based 
approaches to military competition, and the ambiguity in determining if dissuasion is working.  
After examining the conceptual ambiguities inherent in dissuasion, Giles turned to the planning 
challenges, asking how one operationalizes dissuasion planning so that you influence a competitor's 
operations, decision-makers or a group of decision-makers, and thus successfully manipulate peoples' 
motives to compete. And, he asked, how does the United States integrate dissuasion with its other 
defense policy goals? Within an AOR, Giles said there can be ripple effects resulting from dissuasion, 
and this not only might impact plans but may also have an impact on other actors in the AOR. It is 
necessary to understand these relationships well. Giles looked at the relationship between the regional 
commands and the strategic leadership, noting that U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) aims to offer 
"one stop shopping” for combatant commands to meet their "assure, dissuade, deter" planning needs, 
and serve as a clearing house to mitigate competing requests for similar or same intelligence. But, Giles 
wondered if it is appropriate that we are relying on the combatant commands to carry out dissuasion. 
Giles concluded that what comes out in spades is the overriding need for greater interagency 
coordination and collaboration, as the current thinking going on really does not get by DOD thinking about 
dissuasion and deterrence, but it really needs to.  
Discussion  
One discussant observed that there were several new ideas this panel added that were not in the earlier 
discussions, especially concerning the idea of dissuasion of non-state actors, one of the most difficult and 
significant potential targets of dissuasion. Referring to Pilat's presentation, this commentator reiterated 
how infrastructure can be used as a lever, target and tool, and that terrorist infrastructure may be 
something that the United States can manipulate. Additionally, comments were made that that U.S. 
infrastructure is an asset that can be used to further manipulate competitors' decisions. Regarding the 
role of intelligence in dissuasion, a participant noted that intelligence is clearly the most essential 
precondition to success as an enabler of any of these efforts in this arena. One commentator agreed that 
we are signaling from overall U.S. actions and postures, whether we want to or not, so we need to think 
about the positive and negative proliferation signals that emanate from our other actions, such as science 
investments and technology research and development. One participant highlighted Giles discussion of 
interagency dynamics and noted that while such interactions can be crucial in how dissuasion is 
operationalized, they are still nascent and must be explored further. A discussant noted that it was 
important to disaggregate dissuasion in terms of its levers, targets, objectives, and effects. Unlike 
deterrence, which was mainly practiced against one adversary for decades, the United States is 
attempting to dissuade multiple targets, composed of a number of different types of actors, from doing 
several different kinds of activity.  
One participant discussed the role of intelligence in dissuasion, and considered the case study of India 
and U.S. failure to dissuade India from testing again after 1974. The participant observed that U.S. policy 
to dissuade Indian nuclear testing proved successful several times, causing India to hold back on at least 
three occasion prior to its May 1998 tests. The commentator also considered the intelligence role in the 
case of Libya. He explained that when Libya realized the U.S. intelligence community had penetrated 
their supplier network, it was ready to do the "Full Monty," while beforehand it was not expecting to. So 
this commentator concluded that the Indian test experience illustrates the difficulty of reliably acquiring 
specific warning, whereas the Libyan experience provides an example over many years of the use of 
intelligence for the successful use of numerous dissuasive techniques.  
 
Closing remarks  
One participant noted in closing that there are those who were in attendance who think that dissuasion is 
ready to become a strategy concept, but it was just as clear there are also those who think that it is not. 
He also speculated that the very concept of dissuasion might disappear from our strategic lexicon, as 
dissuasion does not do anything in isolation, and it remains "an amorphous blob" that we do not really 
understand. He concluded that he hoped future discussions would cover the whole of the threat 
spectrum, from traditional to irregular to catastrophic to disruptive, while today’s discussion gravitated on 
the traditional challenges. The United States needs to consider ways in which it can be dissuade others 
away from catastrophic and disruptive threats towards less extreme challenges.  
Another participant noted that whether or not the next QDR revives the concept of dissuasion, repeats it 
or sweeps it away, he was confident it would nonetheless incorporate its basics. Regardless of its name, 
dissuasion is assured to be a long lasting idea worthy of further deliberation and analysis, and specifically 
relevant to the new challenges that the United States finds today.  
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